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Abstract—Deception is a technique to mislead human or
computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information.
Successful deception is characterized by the information-
asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the de-
ceiver and the deceivee. This paper proposes a game-
theoretic framework of a deception game to model the
strategic behaviors of the deceiver and deceivee and con-
struct strategies for both attacks and defenses over a con-
tinuous one-dimensional information space. We use the sig-
naling game model to capture the information-asymmetric,
dynamic, and strategic behaviors of deceptions by modeling
the deceiver as a privately-informed player called sender
and the deceivee as an uninformed player called receiver.
We characterize perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE)
solution of the game and study the deceivability. We high-
light the condition of deceivee’s knowledge enhancement
through evidences to maintain the equilibrium and analyze
the impacts of direct deception costs and players’ conflict
of interest on the deceivability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deception is a technique used to cause animals [1],
human [2, 3] or computer systems [4] to have false beliefs.
The purpose of deception is to mislead the deceivees to
behave in a way that is usually against their interests but
is favorable to the deceiver. Deceptions can be viewed as
an approach for attacks as well as defense. For example,
honeyfile is a common deception tool for defense that
creates a fake file directory that behaves like a normal
file system of an active user to detect intrusions or
malicious insiders. Attackers could create a website with
fake promotions to attract target deceivees to reveal their
personal data such as credit card information and social
security number.
Successful deception fundamentally depends on the
information asymmetry between the deceiver and the de-
ceivee. Deceivees need to obtain information that is indi-
rect and difficult to verify for decision-making. Deceivers
can take advantage of this by pretending to be a trustwor-
thy information provider. It is possible to fool, mislead,
or confuse the deceivees. But to do so it may cause them
to take some unforeseen or unfavorable actions to the
deceivers. Therefore, successful deception also requires
the deceivers to have the ability to acquire information,
accurately understand the goals of the deceivees, and make
the induced actions predictable.
The deceivers strategically manipulate the private infor-
mation to suit their own self-interests. The manipulated
information is then revealed to the deceivees, who, on
the other hand, make decisions about the information
received. It is important for the deceivee to form correct
beliefs based on past observations, take into account the
potential damage caused by deception, and strategically
use the observed information for decision-making. If the
deception is necessary to achieve the deceivers’ goal that
would cause damages to the deceivees, the deceivees can
then get prepared to invest resources in detecting and
denying the deceptions as well as recovering the damage.
Deception is costly. Designing and executing deception
requires resource and effort. It is possible that the de-
ceptions incur costs that commensurate with the benefits
from achieving the goal. It is well to be aware that even
the slickest deception plan cannot guarantee the desired
behavior from the deceivee [4]. Thus, the behavior induced
in the deceivee could also incur cost to the deceiver. Other
costs include ex-post penalties caused by, for example,
breaking the law or regulations. The cost and risk are
central to deception that may change the incentive of the
deceiver.
Deception has constraints. In order to make it work
across time and space, the deceiver must have a clear and
consistent understanding about the nature and the envi-
ronment of the system associated with the deceivee. Such
knowledge include the intelligence of the deceivee, the
attack surface of the cyber system, and how the authorized
parties behave within the system. On the deceivees’ side,
they can take advantage of the constraints to put serious
and continuing effort to gather information on any possible
deceptions on the protected system.
In this project, we propose a framework of a deception
game to model the strategic behaviors of the deceiver
and deceivee and construct strategies for both attacks and
defenses over a continuous one-dimensional information
space. We use the signaling game model to capture the
information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors
of deceptions by modeling the deceiver as a privately-
informed player called sender and the deceivee as an
uninformed player called receiver. Additionally, the de-
ceivee is allowed to acquire probabilistic evidence about
the deception through investigations.
We parameterize the costs of deceptions and model
both players as cost-minimizers. The deceivability of the
deception game is analyzed by characterizing the perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). The equilibrium so-
lution of the game provides guidances that can be used
for the mechanism design of a anti-deception system as
well as plans for deception as defense approaches. Our
results show that the deception game admits a class of
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2partial-pooling PBNE that identifies the deceivable and
the undeceivable regions of a one-dimensional information
space. We highlight the condition of deceivee’s knowledge
enhancement through evidences to maintain the equilib-
rium and analyze the impacts of direct deception costs
and the players’ conflict of interest on the deceivability.
A. Related Work
Our deception game is related to a class of security
games of incomplete information. For example, Powell
in [5] has considered a game between an attacker and
a defender, where the defender has private information
about the vulnerability of their targets under protection.
Powell models the information asymmetric interactions
between players by a signaling game, and finds a pooling
equilibrium where the defender chooses to pool, i.e., allo-
cate resources in the same way for all targets of different
vulnerabilities, and the attacker cannot know the true level
of vulnerability of all targets. Brown et al. [6] have studied
a zero-sum game between an attacker and a defender in
the scenario of ballistic missile positioning. They have
introduced the incomplete information to investigate the
value of secrecy by restricting the players’ access to
information.
Previous literature has also considered deception in a
variety of scenarios. Pawlick et al., [7] have considered a
class of deception for network security and extended the
formulation of signaling game [8] by including a detector
that provides probabilistic evidence of deception. They
have analyzed the deceivability in pooling and partially-
separating equilibria of the game. Zhang et al., [9] have
proposed an equilibrium approach to analyze the GPS
spoofing in a model of signaling game with continuous
type space. They have found a PBNE with pooling in
low types and separating in high types, and provided an
equilibrium analysis of spoofing. The model proposed in
Ettinger et al. [10] have used an equilibrium approach to
belief deception in bargaining problems when the agents
only have coarse information about their opponent’s strat-
egy.
This work provides a signaling-game theoretic holistic
quantitative framework to analyze the interactions between
the deceiver and the deceivee and to design mechanisms
that improve the cost efficiency for either party.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
II describes our game model and define the concept of
deceivability. In Section III and IV, we describe the
equilibrium concept and studies the deceivability in the
equilibrium, respectively. Section V illustrates the the-
oretical analysis with numerical examples. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section VI.
II. MODEL
Our deception game contains two players: a deceiver
(sender, S, a.k.a. he) and a deceivee (receiver, R, a.k.a.
she). The game is information asymmetric because the
deceiver privately possesses the target information that is
TABLE I: Summary of notation
Notation Meaning
S, R Deceiver and Deceivee
F(θ˜), f (θ˜) distribution, density of θ
θ ∈Θ, m ∈M, r ∈Θ Signal, Message, Report
Ω(m) : M→Θ Reporting Function
σS(θ) : Θ→Θ Strategy of S
ηS(r) : Θ→M Message Strategy of S
a ∈ A Action of R
σR(r) : Θ→ A Strategy of R
qS(m|θ) Conditional distribution induced by σS
µR(θ |m) (Posterior) Belief of R
CA Cost of S induced by Action a
CD Deception Cost of S
CS =CA +CD Total Cost of S
CR Cost of R
e ∈ E Evidence Acquired by R
γ(e|Ψi,m) Probability of e given event Ψi and m
unknown to the deceivee. There exists conflict of interest
between two players. The deceiver costly manipulates
the information according to the conflict of interest. The
deceivee strategically reacts based on all the information
she has. The existence of deception cost and specific
conflict of interest make the signaling game a nonzero-sum
game even through there is a non-cooperative relationship
between the deceiver and the deceivee.
A. States, Messages, Strategies, Actions, and Beliefs
We consider a game where the informed S commu-
nicates his one-dimensional private information to an
uninformed R. Table I summarizes the notations.
States. We use the notion state to represent the infor-
mation that is unknown to R. S privately possesses the
state θ ∈Θ≡ [θ ,θ ], with −∞< θ < θ <+∞. We assume
that the state θ˜ is continuously distributed according to
a differentiable probability distribution F(θ˜), with strictly
positive density f (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. All aspects of the
game except the value of the true state θ are common
knowledge.
Message and Report. By the notion message, we
describe the format of information about the state S
communicates to R; by the notion report, we represent
the value of state carried by the message. After privately
observing the state θ , S first determines a report r ∈Θ for
the true state θ , and then sends R a message m∈M, where
M is a Borel space of messages. Let Ω : M→ Θ denote
the report interpretation function such that Ω(m) gives the
report r carried in m. Given the true state θ , we say m
tells the truth if Ω(m) = θ . We assume that for each state
θ ∈ Θ, there is a sufficiently large number of messages
that yields the same report, and each m ∈M has a unique
value of report Ω(m). In other words, the message space
can be partitioned as M = ∪rMr, with |Mr| → ∞ for all r
and Mr ∩Mr′ = /0 if r 6= r′, and ∀m ∈Mr, Ω(m) = r. This
assumption can capture the feature of rich language in
practical deceptions. We further assume that message m
is formed by “common language” that can be understood
precisely by both S and R. In other words, function Ω is
3Fig. 1: Deception examples: GPS spoofing (left) and man-
in-the-middle attack (right).
commonly known by both players.
Strategies and actions. Let σS :Θ→Θ be the strategy
of S such that r = σS(θ) determines the report r of the
true state θ . Let ηS :Θ×Θ→M be the message strategy
of S associated with σS such that m = ηS(r) selects the
message m from Mr when the strategy σS(θ) determines
the report r and the true state is θ . Given θ , the strategy
σS(θ) determines the set of messages MσS(θ) for ηS to
choose from, and ηS determines which specific message
m∈MσS(θ) to send. We assume σS(θ) associated with ηS
induces a conditional probability qS(m|θ). After receiving
m, R chooses an action a ∈ A≡Θ according to a strategy
σR :Θ×M→ A using r =Ω(m). σR(r,m) gives the action
R acts upon the message m (and thus r = Ω(m)). The
action a is the final decision of R that represents the
inference about the true state.
Beliefs. Based on m (and thus r =Ω(m)) and her prior
belief f (θ), R forms a posterior belief µR :Θ→ [0,1] of
the true state θ ∈ Θ. The posterior belief µR(θ |m) gives
the likelihood with which R believes that the true state is
θ based on m. R then determines which action to choose
based on her belief µR.
Potential application scenarios include but are not lim-
ited to the following ones.
Example 1: (GPS signal spoofing.) With reference to
Fig. 1, consider that a GPS signal spoofer launches an
spoofing attack targeting on an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV), whose navigation is solely based on GPS sys-
tem. Here, the spoofer is the deceiver and the UAV is
the deceivee. The latitude (resp. longitude) is the state
θA ∈ ΘA (resp. θO ∈ ΘO). The state spaces ΘA and ΘO
identify the activity area of the UAV. The spoofer sends the
UAV a manipulated navigation message m, which contains
data including ephemeris parameters, time parameters, and
service parameters with satellite health information. After
privately possessing the true location coordinates (θA,θO)
of the UAV, the spoofer’s strategy σS(θX) determines
the reported coordinate rX and the associated message
strategy ηS(rX) chooses the navigation message m such
that Ω(m) = rX , for X = A, O. After receiving m, the UAV
takes an action aX according to the strategy σR(rX ,m) for
each coordinate such that aX is the coordinate the UAV
chooses to believe, for X = A, O.
Example 2: (Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM).) Sup-
pose an attacker intrudes into the communication between
a client and a server as shown in Fig. 1. He attempts
to intercept the data and inject false information. Here
the attacker is the deceiver, and the client/server is the
deceivee. The state θ ∈ Θ is the original data, and report
r ∈ Θ is the false data. The message m ∈ M is the data
displayed in the client’s device After privately observing
the true data θ from the server (resp. client), the attacker
determines a report r = σS(θ), and sends a message
m = ηS(r) to the client (resp. server). After receiving m,
the client (resp. server) takes an action a ∈ A≡Θ to infer
the content of the data.
B. Cost Functions
Deception is costly endogenously and exogenously. The
endogenous cost of deception is caused by the induced
action a in R, which is given by CA(a,θ ;b) : A×Θ→ R,
where b ∈ R is the conflict of interest between S and R
that determines the most desired behavior from R for S,
i.e., the goal of deception. b= 0 features perfect common
interest between two players. We allow a quite general
specification of CA, requiring it to only satisfy: for any
state θ , CA is increasing the further the action a is from
the most desired action characterized by b. Since b is not
a decision variable, CA(a,θ ;b) will be written as CA(a,θ)
hereafter. To simplify the analysis, we set CA(a,θ)≡ (a−
(θ +b))2, where θ +b specifies the goal of deception.
The exogenous cost of deception is caused by mis-
representing the true state θ , which takes into account
the efforts and resources to generate the report r and the
message m. We endogenize the cost directly induced by
m in the cost of reporting r by defining the exogenous
cost as CD(r,θ) : Θ×Θ → Θ. Similar to CA, the only
requirement for CD is: for any state θ , the larger r deviates
from θ , the larger the cost CD becomes. In this paper, we
set CD ≡ (r− θ)2. Next, let CS : A×Θ×M→ R denote
the (total) cost function of S defined as
CS(a,θ ,r)≡CA+ kCD, (1)
where k quantifies the intensity of the deception cost CD.
On the deceivee’s side, let CR(a,θ) : A×Θ→R denote
the cost of R. CR takes into account the risk induced by
R’s misinference of the true state θ via her action a. The
only property for the specification of CR is: the further a
is from θ , the larger CR becomes. In this paper, we set
CR ≡ (a− θ)2 denote the cost R suffers when she takes
action a and the true state is θ . Define, for all θ ∈Θ,
αS(θ)≡ argmin
a
CS(a,θ ,r),
and
αR(θ)≡ argmin
a
CR(a,θ),
that is, αR(θ) and αS(θ) are two actions taken by R as
functions of θ that are the most preferred by R and S,
respectively. Clearly, αR(θ)≡ θ and αS(θ)≡ θ +b. For
4convention, if C(x1,x2) is a twice continuously differen-
tiable function, then Ci(x1,x2) = ∂C∂xi and Ci j =
∂ 2C
∂xi∂x j
, for
i, j = 1, 2.
C. Monotone Deception and Deceivability
As a key component of deception, misrepresented state
is costly generated and processed for a purpose that can be
characterized by the conflict of interest b. Merely hiding
the true states by falsified states can induce unforeseen or
unfavorable actions from the deceivee that can increase the
endogenous cost. In this paper, we consider a fixed b > 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. In this case, the deceiver’s most preferred
action is αS(θ) > θ , for all θ ∈ Θ, which allows us to
restrict attention to a class of monotone inflated deception,
in which the strategy profile (σS,σR) satisfies conditions
in the following definition.
Definition 1: A deception with S’s strategy σS and R’s
belief µR is monotone if
• σS(θ) is a non-decreasing function of θ ;
• σR(r,m) is a non-decreasing function of r.
Definition 1 features a class of strategy The monotone
deception in Definition. 1
The deceivability of the deception are described in the
following precise sense.
Definition 2: Given the state θ ∈ [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ], S’s strategy
σS(θ) = r, and message strategy ηS(r) = m,
• R is undeceivable over [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] if σR(r,m) =αR(θ)≡
θ , for all θ ∈ [θ ′′ ,θ ,]. Here, σS(θ) 6= σS(θ ′) for all
θ 6= θ ′ ∈ [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ], and ηS(r)∈Mr. The corresponding
µR is informative. The interval [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] is called
undeceivable region (UR).
• R is deceivable over [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] if the only knowledge
she has is that θ lies in [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ]. R chooses σR(r,m) =
aˆR(θ ′′ ,θ ′), by minimizing the expected cost over
[θ ′′ ,θ ′ ], i.e.,
aˆR(θ
′′
,θ
′
) ∈ arg min
σR∈A
∫ θ ′′
θ ′
CR(σR,θ) f (θ)dθ . (2)
Here, σS(θ) and ηS(r), respectively, choose the
same report r and the same message m, for all
θ ∈ [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ]. Thus, given m, qS(m|θ) is the same for
all θ ∈ [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ], where q ∈ (0,1). The corresponding
µR is uninformative. The interval [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] is called
deceivable region (DR).

D. Knowledge Acquisition: Evidence
We allow R to acquire additional knowledge through
investigations when the state is in a DR, [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ], by
partitioning it into multiple intervals, denoted by a strictly
increasing sequence, < θ0 = θ
′′
,θ1, . . . ,θJ = θ
′
>. Then R
conducts investigations for each interval. In this paper,
we consider the case when there are two investigation
intervals in order to simplify the analysis.
Fig. 2: Signaling games with evidence acquisition by
investigation. The probability γ(e|Ψ,m) of emitting evi-
dence e depends on the event Ψ and the message m sent
by S. If the belief µR is informative, µR is used; if µR is
uninformative, βR is used as the posterior.
Let σ c ∈ (θ ′′ ,θ ′) be the investigation partition state
such that [θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] is partitioned into two non-overlapping
investigation regions Θ0 = [θ ′′ ,θ c] and Θ1 = [θ c,θ ′ ]. Let
Ψ ∈ Γ= {Ψ0,Ψ1}, where Ψi denote the event {θ ∈ Θi},
for i = 0, 1, with the probability P(Ψi) =
∫
Θi f (θ˜)dθ˜∫
[θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] f (θ˜)dθ˜
.
The investigation for Θ0 and Θ1 generates noisy evidence
e ∈ E = {0,1}, where e = i represents Ψi, for i = 0,
1. Suppose that the investigation emits evidence by the
probability γ(e|Ψ,m). Let x = γ(e = 0|Ψ0,m) and y =
γ(e = 1|Ψ1,m) be the two true positive rates, which are
private information of R. With a slight abuse of notation,
let σR(Ψ,m,e) : Γ×M × E → A be the strategy of R
with evidence e. Fig. 2 depicts the signaling game model
for the deception with knowledge acquisition through
investigation.
III. EQUILIBRIUM
In game theory, the concept of equilibrium defines a
strategy profile in which each player best responds to the
optimal strategy of other player(s). In any equilibrium,
no player has incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy. We consider the perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (PBNE) [11] as our solution concept. PBNE
captures the information asymmetry between two players
and asynchronous optimizations of the players. Definition
3 defines the PBNE for the deception game with evidence.
Definition 3: (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) A
PBNE of the game is a strategy profile (σS,σR) and a
posterior belief system (µR,βR) that satisfy the following
conditions:
• (Deceiver’s Sequential Rationality) S minimizes his
expected cost given the deceivee’s strategy σR and
the distribution of the evidence e: for each θ ∈Θ,
σS∗(θ) ∈ argmin
σS
CS(σR∗,θ ,σS). (3)
• (Deceivee’s Sequential Rationality) R minimizes her
expected cost given S’s strategy σS∗ and her posterior
belief µR(θ |m): for any m ∈M,
5– if µR(θ |m) is informative, i.e., Eq. (6),
σR∗(r,m) ∈ arg min
σR∈A
∫
θ∈Θ
CR(σR,θ)µR(θ |m)dθ ;
(4)
– if µR(θ |m) is uninformative over ΘU ≡
[θ ′′ ,θ ′ ]⊆Θ, i.e., Eq. (7),
σR∗(Ψ,m,e)∈ argmin
aˆi
1
∑
i=0
∫
ΘiU
β (Ψi|m,e)CR(aˆi, θ˜) f (θ˜)dθ˜ ,
(5)
where θ 0U ≡ [θ
′′
,θ c], θ 1U ≡ [θ
′′
,θ c], and aˆi ≡
argmin
∫
θ iU
CR(a, θ˜)dθ˜ .
• (Consistent Belief) The posterior belief of R is up-
dated according to Bayes’ rule, as
µR(θ |m) = f (θ)q
S(m|θ)∫
Θ f (θ˜)qS(m|θ˜)dθ˜
. (6)
If
∫
Θ f (θ˜)qS(m|θ˜)dθ˜ = 0, µR(θ |m) may be set to any
probability distribution over Θ.
If µR is uninformative, i.e.,
µR =
f (θ)∫
[θ ′′ ,θ ′ ] f (θ˜)dθ˜
, (7)
R acquires evidence through investigation, and up-
dates belief using evidence as,
βR(Ψ|e,m) = γ(e|Ψ,m)P(Ψ)
∑1j=0 γ(e|Ψ j,m)P(Ψ j)
, (8)
and if ∑1j=0 γ(e|Ψ j,m)P(Ψ j) = 0, βR(Ψ|e,m) may be
set to any probability distribution over Θ.

There are three classes of equilibria: separating equi-
librium (S-PBNE), pooling equilibrium (P-PBNE), and
partial-pooling equilibrium (PP-PBNE). In separating
equilibrium, the deceiver sends message m with different
values of report Ω(m) for different states. Separating
equilibria are also called revealing equilibria because the
strategic deceivee can infer the true state even if Ω(m)
does not tell the truth. In pooling equilibrium, the deceiver
sends message m ∈ Mr with the same value of report
Ω(m) = r for all states. In partial-pooling equilibrium,
however, the deceiver sends the message with the same
report for some states and different reports for other states.
Clearly, the PBNE strategy σS∗ associated with a DR
(resp. UR) is pooling (resp. separating) strategy.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DECEIVABILITY AT EQUILIBRIA
We present the analysis in three steps. In Subsection
IV-A, we identify the conditions about whether S has
incentive to deceive R in equilibria. In Subsection IV-B,
we find the undeceivable region with the property of the
corresponding cost-minimizing strategy of S. In Subsec-
tion IV-C, we find the partially deceivable region with the
necessary boundary conditions.
A. Incentives of Deception
In order to deceive R over the DR [θ ′ ,θ ′′ ], S plays
P-PBNE strategy σS∗(θ) = r, for all θ in the DR, and
the associated ηS(θ) chooses the same m for all θ
in the DR. This P-PBNE strategy induces the action
aˆR = σR∗(Ψ,m,e) given in Eq. (5). However, if S uses
S-PBNE strategy for [θ ′ ,θ ′′ ], R plays a∗ = θ . Since both
players are cost-minimizers, the incentive of S to deceive
R depends on his cost given R’s equilibrium action. If the
cost induced by aˆR is more costly than that induced by
a∗, then S has no incentive to deceive R, and vice versa.
Definition 4 summarizes the property of no incentive to
deceive.
Definition 4: The equilibrium strategy profile (σS∗,σR∗)
satisfies the property of No incentive to deceive (NITD)
over [θ ′ ,θ ′′ ],
CA(aˆR,θ)>CA(θ ,θ),
for all θ ∈ [θ ′ ,θ ′′ ]⊆Θ, where aˆR is given by the strategy
σR∗(Ψi,m,e) in Eq. (5). 
B. Undeceivable Region
In this subsection, we consider if there exists any
PBNE UR in Θ = [θ ,θ ]. From the definition of UR,
the equilibrium strategy of R gives the most preferred
action, αR(θ) ≡ θ , for all θ in the UR. Therefore, in
any differentiable S-PBNE, the cost CS and the strategy
σS have to satisfy the following first-order condition
for optimality given σR∗(θ) = αR(θ) according to the
sequential rationality:
CS1(α
R(θ),θ ,σS(θ))
dαR(θ)
dθ
+CS3(θ ,θ ,σ
S(θ))
dσS(θ)
dθ
= 0.
(9)
Lemma 1 summarizes the property of the strategy σS∗ in
any UR.
Lemma 1: If [θs,θl] is an undeceivable region, then for
each θ ∈ [θs,θl], the equilibrium strategy σS∗(θ)> θ and
it is a unique solution of
dσS(θ)
dθ
=
b
k
(
σS(θ)−θ) , (10)
with initial condition σS∗(θs) = θs. 
Remark 1: The proof is in the full version of this paper.
Since dσ
S(θ)
dθ ≥ 0 and CS1 = −2b is independent of σS,
there is no strategy σS such that CS1
dαR(θ)
dθ = 0 when C
S
3 =
0. Then, Eq. (10) can be obtained from the first order
condition shown in Eq. (9). Since dσ
S(θ)
dθ ≥ 0, we have
dσS∗(θ)
dθ > 0, which means that the optimal strategy of S is
strictly increasing. 
Lemma 1 underlies the following proposition.
Proposition 1: With initial condition σS∗(θ) = θ , there
exists a cut-off state θˆ < θ such that a unique solution σS∗
to Eq. (10) is well-defined on [θ , θˆ ] with σS∗(θˆ) = θ , and
there is no solution to Eq. (10) on (θˆ ,θ ]. 
Remark 2: The proof is in the full version of this paper.
Proposition 1 notes that in S-PBNE, the optimal strategy
6σS∗ of S has to choose a report r that is strictly larger
than the true state θ , but eventually σS∗ runs out of such
report for θ > θˆ . 
In any UR at equilibria, R’s posterior belief is infor-
mative. The endogenous cost induced by the equilibrium
strategy of R together with the exogenous deception cost
CD eliminates the incentive of S to deceive R in any UR
at equilibria.
C. Deceivable Region
Proposition 1 implies that there is no S-PBNE strategy
of S for all θ > θˆ , because there are not enough states to
support the monotone S-PBNE strategy of S for the state
in (θˆ ,θ ]. This suggests a class of PP-PBNE for the state
space Θ, which is separating in low states and pooling
in higher states. For convention, let σS,p : Θ → Θ and
ηS,p, respectively, denote the P-PBNE strategy and the
associated message strategy of S. We define this class of
PP-PBNE by introducing a boundary state as follows.
Definition 5: We say that the strategy σS is a SLAPH
(Separating in Low states And Pooling in High states)
strategy if there exists a boundary state θB ∈ [θ , θˆ ] such
that
• (S-PBNE) σS∗(θ) = r with ηS∗(r) ∈Mr, for all θ ∈
[θ ,θB), and σS∗(θ) 6=σS∗(θ ′) for all θ 6= θ ′ ∈ [θ ,θB);
• (P-PBNE) σS∗,p(θ) = θ with ηS∗,p(θ) ∈Mθ , for all
θ ∈ [θB,θ ].

In any SLAPH equilibrium, both players have no in-
centive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies. This
requires the boundary state θB to be consistent in the sense
that the equilibrium at θB is well-defined. Specifically, the
cost of S has to satisfy the following boundary consistency
(BC) condition at θB:
CS(σR∗(σS,p(θB),mp),θB,mp) =CS(αR(θB),θB,ms),
(11)
where mp ∈ Mθ and ms ∈ MσS∗(θB). The BC condition
implies that S is indifferent between sending mp ∈ Mθ
with a∗ = σR∗(σS∗(θB),mp) and sending ms ∈ MσS∗(θB)
with action a∗ = θB.
The conflict of interest, b, is a cost-relevant parameter
for S that can induce incentives for S to reveal partial
information about any state θ ∈ [θB,θ ] to R while his
cost-minimizing P-PBNE strategy σS∗ is maintained. This
can be achieved based on the assumption |Mθ | → ∞ and
the fact that CD is equally expensive for all the messages
chosen for all state θ ∈ [θB,θ ]. Specifically, the P-PBNE
region [θB,θ ] can be further partitioned into multiple
pools. First, some notations for describing the multiple
pools are needed. Let ΘP ≡ (θ0,θ1, . . . ,θK−1,θK) be a
partition of [θB,θ ], with θ0 = θB < θ1 < · · · < θK = θ .
We call each interval Θ j, j+1 = [θ j,θ j+1] is a pool. With an
abuse of notation, let ηS∗,p(σS∗(θ),θ) denote the message
strategy that chooses a message m ∈ MσS∗(θ) for a state
θ . In each pool Θ j, j+1, ηS∗,p(θ ,θ) chooses the same
message m ∈Mθ , for all θ ∈Θ j, j+1, j = 0, . . . ,K−1.
Without such multiple pools, the posterior belief
µR(θ |m) shown in Eq. (6) can only provide the likelihood
of the event {θ ∈ [θB,θ ]}. With multiple pools, on the
other hand, µR(θ |m) can narrow down the location of
the true state to a specific pool Θ j, j+1 by yielding the
likelihood of the event {θ ∈ Θ j, j+1}. After R deter-
mines a pool Θ j, j+1, she acquires evidence e ∈ {e0,e1}
through investigations by dividing Θ j, j+1 into two sub-
intervals Θ0j, j+1 ≡ [θ j,θ Ij, j+1] and Θ1j, j+1 ≡ [θ Ij, j+1,θ j+1].
Let Ψ j, j+1 ∈ Γ j, j+1 ≡ {Ψ0j, j+1,Ψ1j, j+1} such that Ψij, j+1
represents the event {θ ∈Θij, j+1}, with probability
P(Ψij, j+1) =
∫
Θij, j+1
f (θ˜)dθ˜∫
Θ j, j+1 f (θ˜)dθ˜
,
for i = 0, 1. On the equilibrium path, R must play
σR∗(Ψ j, j+1,m j,e) as defined in Eq. (5) for any m j such
that ηS∗,p(θ ,θ) = m j for all θ ∈Θ j, j+1. Define
aˆi(θ j,θ j+1)≡ argmin
a
∫
Θij, j+1
CR(a,θ) f (θ)dθ , (12)
for i = 0, 1. For brevity, define the following notation:
∆ j, j+1 ≡
∑
e∈E
1
∑
i=0
∫
Θij, j+1
β (Ψij, j+1|m j,e)CR(σR∗(Ψij, j+1,m j,e), θ˜)dθ˜
−
∫
Θ j, j+1
CR(aˆR(θ j,θ j+1),θ)dθ ,
(13)
δ 0j, j+1 =
∫
Θ0j, j+1
(
CR(aˆ0j, j+1,θ)−CR(aˆ1j, j+1,θ)
)
f (θ)dθ ,
(14)
δ 1j, j+1 =
∫
Θ1j, j+1
(
CR(aˆ1j, j+1,θ)−CR(aˆ0j, j+1,θ)
)
f (θ)dθ .
(15)
Here, ∆ j, j+1 gives the expected gain to R over the DR
[θ j,θ j+1] by using evidence e, δ ij, j+1 gives the expected
benefit to R for correctly inferring Ψij, j+1, for i= 0, 1. We
say that the investigation is cost efficient if the ∆ j, j+1 ≥ 0,
for all j = 0, . . . ,K− 1, where aˆR(θ j,θ j+1) is defined in
Eq. (2). Otherwise, R has no incentives to acquire the
evidence e. Furthermore, we say that the investigation is
reliable if δ ij, j+1 ≥ 0, for all j = 0, . . . ,K−1.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of SLAPH equilibrium are summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: (Necessary condition.) In any SLAPH
equilibrium, there exists a boundary state θB such that
the pooling interval [θB,θ ] can be partitioned into mul-
tiple pools denoted by a strictly increasing sequence(
θ0,θ1, . . . ,θK−1,θK
)
with θ0 = θB and θK = θ , such that,
for all j = 0, . . . ,K−1,
CA(a¯(θ j,θ j+1),θ j+1) =CA(a¯(θ j+1,θ j+2),θ j+1), (16)
CS(a¯(θ0,θ1),θB,θ) =CS(θB,θB,σS∗(θB)), if θB > θ ,
(17)
7(a) kb vs. θˆ . θˆ increases and approaches
1 as kb increases.
(b) SLAPH. Here, b = 18 and k = 0.1.
The cut-off state is θˆ = 0.3117.
(c) SLAPH. Changes of σS∗ and σS∗,p
for b = 18 and different value of k.
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where a¯(θ j,θ j+1) = ∑1i=0 P(Ψi)aˆi(θ j,θ j+1), for all j =
0, . . . ,K−1.
(Sufficient Condition.) Given the multiple-pool PBNE
characterized by Eq. (16)-(17), and if θB = θ and
CS(a¯(θ0,θ1),θ ,θ)≥CS(αR(θ),θ ,σS∗(θ)), (18)
there exists a SLAPH equilibrium. 
Note that the deception cost CD is equally expensive
for all θ ∈ [θB,θ ]. Eq. (16) says that at each link state
θ j+1 connecting Θ j, j+1 and Θ j+1, j+2, the costs induced
by a¯(θ j,θ j+1) and a¯(θ j+1,θ j+2), respectively, should keep
the same. Otherwise, S has incentive to deviate from the
current partition to combine these two consecutive pools
by sending the message that induces cheaper CA but the
same CD. This is not ideal for R because larger pools
make the posterior less informative that could increase the
cost for R. Similarly, Eq. (17) says that at the boundary
state θB, S should be indifferent between playing S-PBNE
strategy and inducing action σR∗(θB) versus playing P-
PBNE and introducing action a¯(θ0,θ1). Inequality (18)
notes that if the boundary state θB = θ , then S is indif-
ferent between pooling with [θ ,θ1] and reporting θ for θ
versus separating at θ . The existence of SLAPH requires
(16)-(18) to be jointly satisfied. The following corollary
summarizes the expected gain of R from investigations at
SLAPH.
Corollary 1: At SLAPH, the expected total gain ∆P
produced by the evidences {e j}K−1j=0 is given by
∆P =
K−1
∑
j=0
∆ j, j+1. (19)
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we numerically illustrate the equilibrium
behaviors of both S and R. In the experiments, we set
the minimum value and the maximum value as θ = 0
and θ = 1, respectively. We consider the case when θ
is uniformly distributed over [0,1], i.e., F(θ) = θ . Then,
aˆR(θ ′′ ,θ ′)= θ
′′
+θ
′
2 . Given the initial condition σ
S∗(0)= 0,
the differential equation Eq. (10) can be solved as
exp
(
−k
b
σS∗(θ)
)
+
k
b
(
σS∗(θ)−θ)−1 = 0. (20)
Since S has a well-defined σS∗(θˆ) = 1 for the cut-off state,
we have
θˆ = 1− b
k
(1− exp
(
−k
b
)
). (21)
Fig. 3a shows the cut-off state θˆ for different values
of kb . As can be seen, θˆ increases and approaches 1 as
k
b
increases. This coincides with the intuition that when the
deception cost k is cheap (resp. expensive) relative to the
conflict of interest b, S prefers the pooling (separating)
strategy.
Fig. 3b shows the strategy σS∗ given b= 18 and k = 0.1.
The cut-off state given by Eq. (21) is θˆ = 0.3117. As
shown in Fig. 3b, the cost-minimizing strategy of S is
σS∗ for all state θ ∈ [0,0.3117]; for all θ ∈ (0.3117,1],
there is no solution σS∗ satisfying Eq. (20), and S prefers
to play pooling strategy σS(θ) = 1. Fig. 3c illustrates the
change of σS when b is fixed and k changes.
Fig. 4 shows an example of multiple-pool P-PBNE with
b = 18 , k =
1
64 . In this example, θˆ = 0.06 and θB = 0.
Suppose the belief µR(θ |m) informs R that θ ∈ Θ0,1,
and R partitions Θ0,1 into two investigation regions, Θ00,1
and Θ10,1, by setting θ
I
0,1 = aˆ(0,1) =
1
8 . If e = 0, σ
S∗,p =
a00,1 =
1
16 ; otherwise, σ
S∗,p = a10,1 =
3
16 . Here, a¯(0,1) =
∑1i=0 P(Ψi)ai0,1 =
1
8 and a¯(1,2) = ∑
1
i=0 P(Ψi)ai1,2 =
5
8 .
Then, CA(18 ,
1
4) = C
A(58 ,
1
4) and C
S(18 ,0,1) ≥ CS(0,0,0).
Therefore, a SLAPH exists for this example. Fig. 5
illustrates the corresponding behavior of CR when the true
positive rates are x = y = 0.9. The expected cost with
evidence (expected CR = 0.02) is less than the expected
cost without evidence (expected CR = 0.04).
VI. CONCLUSION
Deception is a technique that can be viewed as an
approach for attacks as well as defense. Understanding
deception quantitatively is pivotal to provide rigor, pre-
dictability, and design principles. In this work, we have
studied deceptions over a continuous one-dimensional
information space. We have modeled the strategic inter-
actions between the deceiver and the deceivee by a signal
game in which the deceivee uses her prior and posterior
beliefs and the evidence acquired through investigations to
8Fig. 4: Example of multiple-pool P-PBNE. Here, θˆ = 14 , θB = 0. There are two pools, i.e., Θ0,1 = [0,
1
4 ] and Θ1,2 = [
1
4 ,1].
S plays σS∗,p = 1 ∀θ ∈ [0,1], and ηS∗,p(1,θ) =m and ηS∗,p(1,θ) =m′ with m 6=m′ ∈M1 for all θ ∈Θ0,1 and θ ∈Θ1,2,
respectively. Each pool is partitioned into two investigation regions, i.e, Θ0i, j and Θ
1
j,k, i 6= j 6= k = {0,1,2}. In this
example, the investigation partition state θ c0,1 = aˆ
R(0, 14) =
1
8 and θ
I
1,2 = aˆ
R(14 ,1) =
5
8 .
Fig. 5: The behavior of costs of R in the example of Fig. 4,
with and without evidence; true positive rates x= y= 0.9.
make her best-effort decision while the deceiver strategi-
cally manipulates the information to mislead the deceivee.
We have studied the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(PBNE) as the solution concept to analyze the outcome of
the deception game and characterize the deceivability of
the game. We have shown that the deception game admits
a class of PBNE called SLAPH (Separating in Low states
And Pooling in High states).
Our results have shown that there is a unique un-
deceivable region if the deception cost is sufficiently
large compared to the conflict of interest between the
deceiver and the deceivee. However, a full undeceivable
region does not exist and there exists a deceivable region.
We have also shown that the deceivable region can be
partitioned into multple sub-deceivable regions without
increasing total costs for the deceiver when the conflict of
interest is insignificant. We have identified the conditions
under which the deceivee can obtain more information for
deceivable regions by acquiring evidence while inducing
disincentive for the deceiver to deviate from the SLAPH.
Future work could focus on the mechanism design for
security systems. Game theory plays an essential role in
mechanism design. Our equilibria as the solution concept
can provide guidance on security system design for de-
fense mechanism against deception as well as defense
mechanism using deception as an approach. For example,
from the deceivee’s point of view, the identification of
undeceivable regions and deceivable regions can provide
additional information for optimal resource allocation to
maintain the undeceivable regions while reducing the
possible damages in the deceivable regions.
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